Comparative psychologists and cognitive developmentalists often share methods and topics of research. Here we review three domains in which there has been particularly fruitful interaction between the fields and reflect on the theoretical positions behind these interactions. Overall, we conclude that there is much to be gained, as cognitive and behavioural scientists, for drawing together work from human children and non-human species. An increasingly popular strategy is for comparative psychologists and cognitive developmentalists to collaborate and exchange findings [1 ]. Cognitive development continues throughout the lifespan but it is the early years of childhood that have most to share with comparative psychology and will be the focus here. First, we review some (and certainly not all) of the domains in which there has been interesting interaction, followed by reflection on the theoretical positions behind these interactions.
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Theory of mind
Theory of mind (attributing mental states to oneself and others) was first described by researchers working with chimpanzees [2] and raised many questions concerning how to assess theory of mind. This challenge was taken up by cognitive developmentalists who devised the unexpected transfer false belief task [3] : participants are asked where someone thinks an object is when they have not seen it moved. Three-year-olds typically answer incorrectly: he will look for the object where it is, but 4-yearolds are more likely to say he will look where he left it. Attempts have been made by both cognitive developmentalists [4] and comparative psychologists [5] to reduce the task demands (especially verbal) to see if success could be identified earlier in humans or in non-human species. Onishi and Baillargeon [6] used looking time measures with infants, aged only 15 months, who discriminated between situations where an actor held a true or false belief. Subsequently, researchers have claimed that even 6-month-olds are sensitive to others' false beliefs [7, 8] .
Originally cognitive development borrowed this topic from comparative psychology. Now the wheel has come full circle and, very recently, a looking-time study showed that bonobos, chimpanzees, and orangutans correctly anticipate how an individual will act based on a false belief [9 ] . Krupenye et al. based their task on Southgate's [10] "seminal anticipatory looking false-belief study with human infants" p111. The remarkable success of nonhuman apes and very young human infants are forcing researchers to think carefully about interpretation (e.g. [11] [12] [13] ). Furthermore, it will be interesting to see whether this new observation of non-human species' performance will dissuade those who have argued that theory of mind is uniquely human from seeing implicit success on the false belief task as gold-standard evidence for theory of mind.
Tool use
A second domain with fruitful exchange between cognitive development and comparative psychology is that of tool use and innovation. In the trap tube task individuals use a stick to push or rake a reward from a horizontal transparent tube. If the reward is pushed or pulled over a trap in the tube, it is lost. In the original study [14] , capuchin monkeys failed to retrieve the reward. Chimpanzees perform better, even succeeding in a control trial with the tube rotated making the trap non-functional (e.g.
[15]). Interestingly, rooks showed mixed performance in a version where they pulled a string to move the reward: while most birds seemed to learn a set of associative rules, one bird solved the task, even when associative rules would result in the wrong behaviour [16] .
Meanwhile, cognitive development has focussed on social aspects of tool use, recognising that the diversity of human tool use must rely on transfer between generations of individuals (cumulative culture, see e.g. [17] ). However, researchers often overlooked individual tool-use abilities. Indeed, the first study of human children's performance on the trap tube was concerned with adult demonstrations not children's independent problem solving [18] . Two-and three-year-olds rarely retrieved the 
